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IN1RODUCTION 
The nation's ongoing battIe over defining wetlands has been 
portrayed as a tense political conflict between environmental 
protection advocates and economic development forces. A 
more accurate interpretation of the situation, I assert, is this: in 
our struggle to identify a diverse, complex and vast body of 
water systems in one definition, we have created a situation of 
extremes. Too vague a definition includes lands not worthy of 
protection by environmentalist standards. An overly-specific 
definition leaves wild systems open to commercial develop-
ment. 
The search for an appropriate wetlands definition is particu-
larly relevant for Georgia With 5.3 million wetland acres, 
Georgia ranks eighth among the contiguous states in total 
wetlands area The Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that 
between the 1780s and 1980s nearly twenty-three percent of 
Georgia's wetlands were converted to other uses. This trans-
lates to an annual conversion rate of 7,700 acres. (Dahl, 1990). 
In Georgia or at the national level, ethics can assist the 
wetlands delineation conflict to resolution. An ethical approach 
does not prove one side right and the other side wrong, nor does 
it provide a theoretical resolution removed from the real world. 
Instead, it redefines the issue so that the values in each position 
that are worthwhile, yet which are perceived to be in opposition, 
may be seen as potentially reinforcing and achievable in con-
cert. 
BACKGROUND 
"What is a wetland?" This question has been intensely 
debated ever since a federal district court ruled in 1975 that 
wetlands were subject to the Clean Water Act404(k) permitting 
program. Up until 1989 the answer to "What is a wetland?" 
differed depending on which government entity was asked. 
During that time the key agencies involved in wetlands protec-
tion - the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Soil Conser-
vation Service - all used different wetlands delineation crite-
ria. 
That situation changed when the agencies, motivated by 
President Bush's 1988 campaign promise of "no net wetlands 
loss," teamed up to develop the Federal Manual for Identifying 
and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands. This interagency 
document outlined national wetlands delineation criteria based 
on the presence of a combination of soil, hydrology, and 
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vegetation characteristics. Landowners, developers and farm-
ers reacted strongly against the manual, asserting (among other 
things) that its delineation criteria were too broad and, as a 
result, subjected relatively dry, commercially productive lands 
to the permitting process. After an investigation President 
Bush's Council on Competitiveness agreed with the manual's 
opponents and mandated major modifications. 
The revised manual, released in 1991, narrowed the wetlands 
delineation criteria to the documented presence of three highly 
specific soil, hydrology and vegetation indicators. This require-
ment provoked an onslaught of feedback, mostly from environ-
mentalists who feared the criteria would be so explicit that it 
would leave half the nation's wetlands open for development. 
To illustrate the magnitude of the controversy, a 6O-day public 
comment period that was to end in December, 1991, was 
extended. By June 1992,90,000 mostly critical comments were 
submitted to the Army Corps of Engineers regarding the revised 
manual. 
WE1LANDS PRorncrION: WHAT WENT WRONG? 
Many reasons have been posed as to why wetlands protection 
evolved into such a heated battle. Some say that lawyers rather 
than ecologists played a major role in the revision process, and 
as a result the proposed re-definition was scientifically unsound. 
Others feel the wetlands conflict is a larger issue that encom-
passes the classic struggle between protection-oriented envi-
ronmentalists and profit-oriented industry. An even broader 
hypothesis asserts that the United States lacks an environmental 
ethic from which goals and objectives can be outlined, 
decisionmaking criteria can be developed, and policy decisions 
can be made. 
Regardless of which reason is the causal link to the current 
conflict, the development of a national environmental ethic 
could mandate a central role for scientists in the policymaking 
process and could also outline national environmental priorities 
that strike middle ground between environmental protection 
and economic development. The frrst step in developing a 
national consensus would be to examine current ethical ap-
proaches and evaluate their strengths and weakness. Then, the 
best elements of each could be extracted and integrated into a 
new, national environmental guideline. This paper will attempt 
a similar exercise, focusing on wetland delineation. Four 
environmental concepts will be surveyed and briefly analyzed 
for their overall potential impacts on the wetlands delineation 
moralism, it assumes that preservation ~ occur. But, like 
cost-benefit analysis, it gives weight to costs in preservation 
decisions. 
For policy issues like pollution control and endangered 
species protection, SMS provides sound environmental protec-
tion criteria. For example, a paper company polluting a river 
would have to control its emissions and clean up the river, unless 
doing so would result in unemployment and economic depres-
sion for an area. Similarly, a timber company wanting to raze 
a forest that houses an endangered species would have to prove 
that the costs of protecting the species from extinction are 
prohibitive. Richard Bishop, a resource economist at the 
University of Wisconsin, has used SMS for a number of specific 
endangered species cases and has concluded that many preser-
vation efforts are not very costly (Bishop, 1978). 
According to SMS, wetlands should be protected unless the 
costs of doing so are unbearable. If given the choice between a 
broad definition that includes too much land and a narrow one 
that protects too little, an advocate of SMS would probably 
choose the broad definition. After aU, preservation is something 
that.shmlkl occur. A farmer or real~estate developer would have 
to prove that protecting the wetlands he wishes to use would 
pose unbearable cost to his company, the community and the 
local economy. Consider that a broad wetlands definition will 
designate for protection many small parcels of land located 
within larger developable tnlcts. A small wetland cannot be 
both developed and preserved: it must be one or the other. 
Because of exorbitant land values and the opportunity costs of 
land not developed or farmed. it would seem fairly easy to 
conclude that the costs of protecting wetlands would be prohibi-
tive. A similar conclusion was reached in Connecticut, where 
a court allowed a New Haven wetland to be paved over for a 
shopping center deemed crucial to the area's economy. 
HIERARCHY THEORY: 
PROVIDING BETTER UNDERSTANDING 
Hierarchy theory aids wetlands policy analysis by providing 
a better understanding of how the water systems operate within 
bigger environmental systems. According to this concept, 
nature is made up of parts and wholes. Parts are fast-moving, 
individual ecosystems. Many parts comprise a whole, which is 
a slower moving ecosystem. The whole can impact the parts, but 
each part is unable to impact the whole - unless it is operating 
in tandem with other individual parts. For example, if an 
alligator in the Florida Everglades dies, it is unlikely that other 
species in the Everglades will be affected. (Here, the alligator 
represents a part to the Everglades whole.) When many alliga-
tors die the parts operating in tandem - the Everglades 
experiences a decline in the population of other species. Why? 
Because alligator wallows provide the other species with their 
water source. The elimination of one water source might not 
make much impact, but the elimination of many water sources 
has potential for devastation of the entire natural system. This 
example demonstrates the interconnectedness of parts and wholes 
- while the individual parts are often expendable, individuals 
must exist to perform important functions in the larger system. 
Hierarchy theory builds on an ecological concept, sometimes 
referred to as "contextualism," that originated with forester 
Aldo Leopold. Leopold set out three principles to guide actions 
against the environment: (a) the food chain is the basic organiz· 
ing structure of the system; (b) the trend of evolution is to 
elaborate the biota; and (c) energy flows upwards. These 
principles each contribute to system complexity, which, in turn, 
contributes to ecosystem health. Human activity, so the theory 
goes, shortchanges system complexity and inflicts damage. The 
degree of damage is detennined by the fragility of the ecosys-
tem, the size of the human population, and the speed of human 
activities. 
The dust bowl is a good example of the ecosystem damage 
that can result from violation of contextualist principles. In 
Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, Bryan Norton ex-
plains how hiemrchy theory provides insight into this ecologi. 
cal disaster: 
The dust bowl proved that rapid and 
pervasive changes in human use of land 
can lead to breakdowns of entire geo-
graphical systems; such breakdowns both 
signal and exacerbate destruction of the 
complexity and integrity of the land 
system. destroying the complex pathways 
by which energy flows through the system. 
Hierarchy theory, which aspires to model 
and relate the various temporal scales that 
constitute ecological complexi~y, may 
therefore provide a precise means to 
explore the thresholds and limits beyond 
which human-induced changes on larger 
systems, such as the whole atmosphere, are 
likely to result in ecological breakdowns 
with unacceptable consequences. (p. 213.) 
Hierarchy Theory could be used, within a broad or narrow 
definition of wetlands, to decide borderline and disputed cases. 
Using the contextualist's framework, consumption of the re· 
source would be analyzed according to its impact on larger 
human and natural systems. Development deemed to inflict 
irreversible or unacceptable damage would be prohibited. Con-
versely, if a parcel did not serve any crucial biological functions. 
it would be open for development. 
Notice the shift in emphasis from physical attributes to 
system functions. This. I believe, illuminates a major weakness 
in defining a wetland by its characteristics. Physical attributes 
do not fully explain a parcel's function within its respective 
whole. Hierarchy theory seems to suggest that, rather than 
identify wetlands by characteristics, we should attempt to derme 
them by the functions they serve within larger environmental 
and human systems. That way, when their consumption is 
proposed, the damage that results from having these functions 
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process. Then, elements of each approach will be selected and 
integrated into one paradigm that helps overcome weaknesses 
in the current wetlands delineation process. 
Moralism, the fltSt concept to be analyzed, positions environ-
mental protection as a matter of right versus wrong. Cost-
benefit analysis, the second concept, is adecisionmakingmethod 
based on weighing consumer preference for environmental 
protection. The third concept, the Safe Minimum Standard 
Approach to Conservation, blends aspects of moralism and 
cost-benefit analysis - it is a decisionmaking method for 
pursuing morally sound environmental actions. And Hierarchy 
Theory, the fourth concept, is an ecological construct that 
provides a better understanding of the systems for which poli-
cies are developed. 
MORALISM: AN ETIllCAL VIEW 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
Moralism regards the protection of the environment as a 
matter of ethics. This stance is supported by two notions: (a) that 
ecosystems and species have aright to exist apart from any value 
placed on them by humans and therefore (b) that ecosystems are 
not resources at all. This view makes it immoral to undertake a 
policy action without regard for its impact on natural systems. 
To do so would be the equivalent of implementing a policy 
without regard for human life. 
Because moralism regards natural systems as inherently 
valuable, it rejects the need to impose economic value in order 
to justify preservation. David Ehrenfeld summarizes this view 
in a passage from his book The Arrogance of Humanism: 
... we have been much too careless in our 
use of resource arguments distorting and 
exaggerating them for short-term purposes 
and allowing them to confuse or dominate 
our long-term thinking. Resource reasons 
for conservation can be used if honest, but 
must always be presented together with the 
non-humanistic reasons and it should be 
made clear that the latter are more impor-
tant in every case. (p. 210) 
If environmental policymakers were all moralists, then the 
original. broader defmition of wetlands would be preferred 
because it errs on the side of wetlands preservation. More 
wetlands would be protected and some economic sacrifice 
would occur, which would be acceptable. This is not to say that 
moralists would want illl wetlands to be protected; some land 
parcels would invariably be recognized as better suited for 
development or farming. However, it would make a moralist far 
more comfortable to operate under a definition that favors 
protection than to risk the loss of half the nation's wetlands 
inventory. 
Using the broad definition, however, would produce some of 
the same problems encountered in 1989. Land not worthy of 
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protection, even by environmentalist standards, would be kept 
from more profitable farming or development. And negative 
publicity about inflexible standards might undermine public 
confidence in the practicality of valuing the environment. 
COST-BENEFIT ANAL YSIS: 
WEIGlllNG CONSUMER PREFERENCE 
Moralists view environmental protection as an ethical im-
perative, whereas the cost-benefit analysis approach regards it 
as the result of consumer preference measured in dollars. How 
much would people be willing to pay to protect a wetland? 
What is the dollar value of fishing and recreational benefits 
provided by the water systems? How much will water pollution 
and flood damage cost if certain wetlands are eliminated? If the 
sum of these values outweighs the costs of protecting the 
wetland, then the wetland should and will be protected. 
Where moralism would risk protecting too many wetlands, 
cost-benefit analysis promises to protect too few. Many wet-
lands functions, like water pollution control, flood regulation 
and recreation, would be easily measured in dollar value. 
However, not all wetlands benefits can be assigned monetary 
worth -like a beautiful view or an endangered species. These 
benefits are regarded by many, especially moralists. as priceless 
and any attempts to assign price will only underrepresent their 
true value. As for willingness-to-pay, moralists contend that 
many consumers don't have complete knowledge of the ben-
efits they gain from wetlands, so they are not fully equipped to 
indicate their preferences. Again, this results in 
underrepresentation of the wetlands values of the environment. 
A cost-benefit analyst as the environmental authority might 
devise a definition that counts only those ecosystems offering 
measurable benefits. So wetlands that abate pollution, control 
floods, nurture fishing grounds and provide recreational values 
will be protected, while those that house wildlife habitat, replen-
ish groundwater, and facilitate the food chain will be left open 
to development The percentage of wetlands protected versus 
developed would depend on how many provide measurable 
benefits significant to outweigh economic gain. Using cost-
benefit analysis the nation would run the risk of losing even 
more endangered species and permanently damaging the eco-
logical balance until a method was devised for valuing other 
wetlands benefits. 
SAFE MIN1MUM STANDARD: 
PRESERVATION AT REASONABLE COST 
An alternative to the cost-benefit approach is called Safe 
Minimum Standard of Conservation (Ciriacy-Wantrup1959). 
1959). The SMS criterion states that a resource should be 
preserved unless the costs for doing so are unbearable. The 
burden of calculating preservation costs are on the prospective 
resource user. An advantage to this approach is that, like 
removed will be easy to predict 
Relatively easy, anyway. The challenges to using hierarchy 
theory to develop a function-centered defmition are formidable, 
and include the potential for bias: 
Hierarchy theorists recognize that the 
analysis of any complex system will 
depend upon the observer's viewpoint and 
on the scale of resolution adopted, which is 
a function of the place the observer 
assumes in viewing the complex system. 
Choosing the place involves deciding on 
both (1) the perspective of the resource 
manager and (2) the scale on which to 
conceptualize the larger system or context 
of which it is a part. which involves setting 
ecosystem boundaries. (Bryan Norton's 
Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, p. 
246) 
This passage suggests that a function-based definition would 
vary greatly depending on who is formulating the definition. 
Pro-environmental protection forces would be predicted to 
identify hundreds of intricate functions that would capture all 
diverse wetland processes. Developers, in contrast, might wish 
to focus on a few, major functions so that only "real" wetlands" 
would be protected. While a function-based definition would 
face similar problems as the characteristic-based one, distin-
guishing between ecologically important systems and develop-
able lands would become easier. 
Another challenge is that a function-based delineation pro-
cess would rely heavily on wetlands ecology, which is a rela-
tively new science going back only two decades. Scientists are 
still learning about the functions wetlands perfonn, such as for 
nutrient retention and carbon cycling. Therefore, uncertainty in 
wetlands ecology could result in long and expensive learning 
curves during the delineation process. 
INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL PIllLOSOPHIES 
The environmental concepts discussed in this paper yield 
very different potential solutions to the wetlands. delineation 
conflict Moralism, because it views wetlands protection as an 
ethical imperative, would probably favor the broad defmition 
that protects the most ecosystems. Cost-benefit analysts, with 
their focus on assessing consumer preference, might propose a 
definition that only recognizes ecosystems offering measurable 
benefits,1ike tourist value. pollution control, and flood convey-
ance. A Safe Minimum Standard advocate might choose a 
broad defmition that preserves more wetlands, but would not be 
able to protect most of them when development interests easily 
prove the opportunity costs of land use is prohibitive to preser-
vation. And Hierarchy Theory might provide us with an 
alternative definition completely, one that focuses on function 
instead of characteristics. 
That these concepts provide different conclusions doesn't 
preclude us from borrowing the best elements of each for an 
integrated approach to a national environmental ethic. For 
example, from moralists, we would adopt the view that the 
environment is intrinsically valuable and its protection is an 
ethical matter. To reach this mindset, environmental poli-
cymakers would need to create awareness of nature's role in the 
fulfillment of the good life. This was recognized by Leopold as 
critical to the public's acceptance of an ethical view of environ-
mental protection: 
The task of American culture, Leopold concluded, is 
to construct a mental model of the good life, but to 
do so within the constraints imposed by ecological 
systems ... The cultural harvest from the land is the 
contribution of an organic conception of the good 
life. It is so because society does not yet have a 
definition of the good life that managers can use as a 
blueprint In the tradition of Thoreau and Muir he 
connected the "quiet desperation" of materialism 
and consumerism with alienation from nature. And 
thus the task of the environmental manager, besides 
managing, is to play midwife to the public's 
ecologically informed idea of the good life. (Bryan 
Norton's Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, 
p.55) 
From cost-benefit analysis, we can adopt the willingness~to~ 
pay concept and transform it into a tool for environmental 
protection. This will only happen, however, if we successfully 
incorporate environmental protection into mainstream Ameri-
can values. If we sufficiently value the environment then we 
will pay for environmental protection. Willingness-to-pay 
could potentially become our defense mechanism against blind 
development interests, and in using it as such, we will become 
more adept atassigning value to the environment Admittedly, 
however, such a prolXlsition could be enormously ex~nsive. 
A national environmental ethic could utilize all of the ele-
ments of hierarchy theory. First. hierarchy theory would allow 
wetlands ecologists to playa more prominent role in environ-
mental protection. Greater participation by these scientists 
would uncover the weaknesses inherent in attempting a single 
wetlands definition, for example, uniform requirements that 
ignore regional wetness variations. It also might result in the 
development of function-based delineation criteria. 
Hierarchy theory could also be used as an explanatory tool in 
environmental education, a benefit which could help achieve 
the integration of environmental protection into mainstream 
values. Once people understand the benefits they receive on a 
day-to-day basis from healthy ecosyS1ems, it will be much 
easier to prove their cultural value. Policymakers would also 
benefit from enhanced understanding, through their ability to 
make sounder environmental decisions. 
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When the pieces of these concepts are put together, we have 
an environmental ethic that provides a framework for under· 
standing the ramifications of wetlands desbuction; that more 
effectively distinguishes wetlands from developable land; that 
protects the environment because it is a valuable element of our 
culture and, thus, it is the right thing to do; and that seeks to strike 
a balance between protection of environmental values and 
economic development. 
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